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C O R P O R A T EG O V E R N A N C EA SA
COMMITMENT AND SIGNALLING DEVICE
Angelo Baglioni
Abstract. A model is presented, where ﬁrms issuing equity diﬀer in the
ability of their controlling shareholders to extract private beneﬁts: this cre-
ates a lemon problem, leading to cross-subsidization across issuers. A gover-
nance institution is introduced, enabling large shareholders to (imperfectly)
commit to the general interest of shareholders. The following main results
are obtained. I) Controlling shareholders willing to apply such an institution
are those with a level of private beneﬁts either very low or very high: the
former employ the institutional constraint as a signalling device, the latter
as a commitment device. Those with an intermediate level of private beneﬁts
are not interested. II) A higher ownership concentration reduces the large
shareholder’s incentive to commit. III) Self-regulation dominates regulation.
Keywords: large shareholders, private beneﬁts, (self-)regulation.
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11 Introduction
The divergence of interests between large and small shareholders is a hot
topic in corporate ﬁnance. Large shareholders exercise their control rights
in order to maximize their own utility: this might not be congruent with
the maximization of ﬁrm value, which is the interest of all shareholders.
In the jargon of ﬁnancial theory, this issue goes under the label of "private
beneﬁts" possibly extracted by controlling shareholders1. Both corporate law
and self-regulatory initiatives (like codes of conduct) have pushed towards the
introduction of institutions which should be able, in principle, to reduce the
scope for the extraction of private beneﬁts by large shareholders: independent
directors, committees, auditors, two-tier boards are the main examples.
Empirical evidence suggests that, when the adoption of those institutions
are left to the discretion of companies, some of them are adopted by the large
majority of ﬁrms, while others are much less common. For example, a recent
analysis of the compliance with the Code of conduct, introduced by the Milan
Stock Exchange, shows that almost all Italian listed ﬁr m sh a v ea tl e a s to n e
independent director, and on average almost half of the board of directors is
made up of independent ones (5 out of 11). To the contrary, the presentation
of election lists by minority shareholders at general shareholders’ meetings
is much less diﬀused: less than half Italian listed ﬁrms (47%) have election
lists, and even less reserve some seats in the board to minority shareholders.
T h es a m es t u d ys h o w st h a t ,w h i l ea na u d i tc o m m i t t e ea n dac o m p e n s a t i o n
committee are present in almost all Italian listed ﬁrms, only a few (10%)
employ a nomination committee2.
1In this paper the focus is on the possible extraction of private beneﬁts by a dominant
shareholder, which is a common problem in countries where ﬁrms exhibit a high level of
ownership concentration (continental Europe). In other countries (U.S. and U.K.), the
relevant divergence of interests may arise between managers and shareholders of public
companies. The theory of control rights in corporate ﬁnance is surveyed by Tirole (2006),
in particular chapters 9 and 10. Empirical estimates of the value of control are provided
− among others − by Dyck - Zingales (2004) and Nenova (2003): the former exploits the
diﬀerence between the price paid in a control block transaction and the market price of
shares; the second is based on the price diﬀerence between multiple and limited voting
shares.
2These data come from SpencerStuart (2006), and are based on the annual reports
on corporate governance released by listed ﬁrms. Another analysis, made by the Milan
Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana, 2006), points to the same evidence: for instance, out of
40 companies included in the S&P/MIB Index, 19 have election lists, of which 16 reserve
some seats to minority shareholders.
2In some countries, the structure of the board of directors is left to the
discretion of shareholders. In particular, companies incorporated in France
and Italy are free to adopt a two-tier structure, but only a few ones have
chosen to do so3. To the contrary, the two-tier structure is mandatory in
Germany.
During the current year (2007), a new corporate act has entered into force
in Italy4, mandating the presence of (at least) one independent director and
one representative of minority shareholders in the board of listed ﬁrms. In
U.K. the Combined Code (part of the Listing Rules issued by the FSA in
2003) recommends that at least half of the board is composed of independent
non-executives. At European level, the Commission Recommendation of 15
February 2005 mandates the presence of "a suﬃcient number of" indepen-
dent directors, and it recommends the creation of (nomination, remuneration
and audit) committees, where the independent directors should play a key
role. In the U.S. the Sarbanes - Oxley Act (2002) has introduced a tough
regulation in matters previously left to self-regulation (e.g. the oversight of
the audit sector, with the creation of the PCAOB). In general, the regulatory
intervention in the area of corporate governance has become stronger, also
as a response to some well known scandals.
The above stylized facts raise some interesting questions. Why a domi-
nant shareholder might voluntarily want to reduce the scope for the extrac-
tion of private beneﬁts? Which governance institutions are more likely to be
adopted through self-regulation? More importantly, which ones are able to
produce better outcomes? Should the introduction of such institutions be
left to the discretion of shareholders or be imposed by the regulator?
This work provides some tentative answers, that may be summarized as
follows. First, when the adoption of a governance institution - limiting the
extraction of private beneﬁts by dominant shareholders - is left to the dis-
cretion of large shareholders themselves, those more interested in applying
such an institution are the ones with a level of private beneﬁts either very
low or very high. The former employ the institutional constraint as a sep-
arating device, enabling them to signal their quality to the market. The
latter employ it as a commitment device, in order to overcome their own
incentive distortion (like in any time inconsistency problem)5.T h o s e w i t h
3While in Italy this option has been introduced only recently (2003), in France it dates
back to 1966.
4"Legge sul risparmio", n. 262/2005.
5Doidge - Karolyi - Stulz (2001) provide empirical evidence consistent with the view
3an intermediate level of private beneﬁts are not interested. Second, only
those governance institutions, providing a credible commitment to neglect
private beneﬁts, may be used by some dominant shareholders to signal their
quality; an institution carrying no real commitment is applied by all large
shareholders, since the cost of a soft constraint is low6. Third, the separation
outcome may be achieved only by self-regulation, leading to an improvement
over regulation. Finally, the relationship between ownership concentration
and the incentive to apply the institution is negative: the higher the equity
stake of the controlling shareholder, the lower the incentive7.
The paper closest to mine is Graziano - Luporini (2005), analyzing the
properties of diﬀerent board structures: they interpret the two-tier structure
as a way through which a large shareholder can commit to limit his own
interference with management; their prediction is that shareholders more
willing to commit are those with lower private beneﬁts, since they have less
to loose. The composition of the board of directors is analyzed by Dahya -
Dimitrov - McConnell (2005), where the ability of a dominant shareholder to
divert resources is limited by the presence of independent directors: control-
ling shareholders with lower equity stakes wish to have fewer independent
directors in the a board, allowing them to divert more resources. Both these
papers reach quite diﬀerent conclusions from mine: the reason is that they
overlook the impact of the ability to extract private beneﬁts on the equilib-
rium price of corporate liabilities (in particular, of equity).
The issue of large shareholders’ interference with managers has been
raised by Burkart - Gromb - Panunzi (1997): however, in their framework
the drawback of shareholders’ interference is not related to their ability to
that foreign ﬁrms cross-list in the U.S., in order to exploit the stronger protection of
minority shareholders as a commitment to limit the extraction of private beneﬁts. Similar
results are obtained by Reese - Weisbach (2001).
6Under this regard, the extremely large diﬀusion of non-executive "independent" di-
rectors in corporate boards raises some doubts, relative to their eﬀectiveness in stopping
opportunistic behavior of executives. Recent empirical evidence on self-regulation is not
encouraging: the adoption of codes of conduct does not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact
on the market value of listed ﬁrms, pointing to a lack of credibility of such codes (see
Nowak - Rott - Mahr, 2006 on Germany and deJong - DeJong - Mertens - Wasley, 2005
on the Netherlands).
7The empirical evidence provided by Santella - Drago - Paone (2006) on Italian listed
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms is consistent with such prediction: they ﬁnd that those ﬁrms with
more concentrated ownership exhibit a lower level of compliance with some independence
requirements of directors.
4extract private beneﬁts, but rather to the adverse eﬀect on managers’ incen-
tive to exert eﬀort. The theoretical literature on corporate boards is rapidly
growing. For example, the two-tier board structure is considered by Adams -
Ferreira (2005): managers are more willing to release information to a man-
agement board separated from the supervisory board (thus avoiding that the
same information they reveal, in order to improve board decisions, is used for
monitoring themselves). Other contributions are: Harris - Raviv (2005), Oz-
erturk (2005), Pirchegger - Schondube (2006), Hermalin - Weisbach (1998),
Warther (1998). The empirical literature on corporate boards is surveyed by
Hermalin - Weisbach (2003).
T h ep l a no ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s .I nS e c t i o n2ab a s i cl e m o np r o b l e m
is presented, where issuers diﬀer in their ability to extract private beneﬁts of
control. Section 3 introduces a regulation, imposing an (imperfect) commit-
ment to pursue the general interest of shareholders. In Section 4 the adoption
of a governance institution, implying such a type of commitment, is left to
the discretion of controlling shareholders (through self-regulation): here our
main results are derived. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary.
2 The basic model
2.1 Assumptions
Let us consider a population of entrepreneurs.
Assumption 1. Each entrepreneur is the owner of a ﬁrm with value
V = Vmax − B,w h e r eB denotes his private beneﬁts of control. He sells
an (exogenous) equity stake (1 − α) to external dispersed investors (small
shareholders), receiving a revenue denoted by R. He retains control over his
own ﬁrm for any relevant values of his stake α (in particular, for αh and αl
deﬁned below).
Assumption 2. After issuing equity, entrepreneurs have to decide the opti-
mal value of B; this cannot be contracted ex ante, due to the incompleteness
of contracts.
Assumption 3. The population is made up of two types of entrepreneurs:
good and bad (t ∈ {g,b}). The proportion of g-type over total is k.
Assumption 4 (good type). The utility function of g-type is: αV + R.
Assumption 5 (bad type). The utility function of b-type is u(B)+αV +R,
where: u(B) is strictly concave, u(0) = 0, ∃b B>0 such that u0(b B)=1(see
5Figure 1).
Assumption 6 (hidden information). Entrepreneurs know their own type.
Investors do not observe each entrepreneur’s type.
Assumption 7. External investors are risk neutral. Due to competition
among them, investors demand an expected return equal to the riskless rate
of interest, which is normalized to zero.
All the above assumptions are common knowledge.
A few comments are in order. All entrepreneurs have to raise external
funds in the form of equity: this enables us to focus on the conﬂict of interest
between controlling and minority shareholders. After selling a share 1 − α
of equity to dispersed investors, an entrepreneur is supposed to retain the
control over the ﬁrm, thanks to his stake α. He may exercise this control right
either by directly running the ﬁrm or by interfering with managers delegated
to run the ﬁrm (we abstract from the issues related to this delegation, as
our focus is on conﬂicts between large and small shareholders). Minority
shareholders get formal control rights as well, but they have no incentive to
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Fig.1 - Utility of private beneﬁts (bad type)
6All ﬁrms are assumed to be identical under all regards but one: while the
goal of good entrepreneurs is to maximize the value of their ﬁrms, this goal is
somewhat distorted for bad entrepreneurs. The latter are also interested in
maximizing their own private beneﬁts of control, for example: perks, empire
building, deals with related parties, diversion of funds. The extraction of
private beneﬁts reduces the value of the ﬁrm. Moreover, the information
regarding private beneﬁts is typically not veriﬁable or simply too complex to
describe in detail, so ﬁnancial contracts cannot prescribe a speciﬁc level of
B.
This framework is designed to capture the heterogeneity across ﬁrms:
in some of them the ability or willingness of the dominant shareholder to
extract private beneﬁts of control are higher than in others; for simplicity,
the utility function of a good type completely rules out private beneﬁts.
The determinants of these private beneﬁts are not perfectly observable by
external investors: for example, a small shareholder does not know whether
the controlling party supports a merger because it is a good deal or because
he wants to increase his own power. This asymmetry of information creates
a "lemon problem" that we will address below.
2.2 The equilibrium level of private beneﬁts
Lemma 1 states, within our framework, the well known result of Jensen -
Meckling (1976): after selling equity, a b-type entrepreneur is induced to
increase his own private beneﬁt s ,a sh ei sa b l et os h i f tp a r to ft h ec o s tt o
small shareholders, while retaining the full beneﬁt. Let us denote B∗ the
equilibrium level of private beneﬁts for a b-type (the level of private beneﬁts
of a g-type is trivially zero, due to assumption 4). While a full owner (α =1 )
sets his private beneﬁts to a level b B, an entrepreneur retaining a fraction of
equity (α<1)e x t r a c t sB∗ > b B.
Lemma 1 B∗ is a decreasing function of α. In particular: B∗(1) = b B and
B∗(α) > b B for any α<1.




u(B)+α(Vmax − B) (1)




7which implicitly deﬁnes B∗(α) as a decreasing function. B∗(1) = b B by
deﬁnition (assumption 5).
We may now be more speciﬁca b o u tt h ee x o g e n o u sl e v e lo fe q u i t yr e t a i n e d
by each entrepreneur.
A s s u m p t i o n8 .T h ee x o g e n o u ss h a r eo fe q u i t yr e t a i n e db ya ne n t r e p r e n e u r
is either αh ∈ (0,1) or αl ∈ (0,1),w i t hαh > α>α l,w h e r eα is deﬁned by:
B∗(α)=u[B∗(α)]. Within each group of entrepreneurs - those retaining a
stake αh and those retaining a stake αl - the proportion of g-type is k.
Of course, the share of equity retained by an entrepreneur is public in-
formation. However, by observing α an investor is not able to infer his
type (good or bad), since within each group of entrepreneurs - those re-
taining a high and those retaining a low fraction of equity - both types are
present8. Assumption 8 enables us to state that: B∗(αh) <B ∗(α) <B ∗(αl),
u[B∗(αh)] >B ∗(αh),a n du[B∗(αl)] <B ∗(αl) (see Figure 1).
2.3 Full information: the time inconsistency issue
Let us momentarily remove Assumption 6 and assume that each entrepre-
neur’s type is public information. This enables us to focus on the ineﬃcient
choice of private beneﬁts by bad entrepreneurs. Their problem may be seen
as a time inconsistency issue. If their level of private beneﬁts were selected
before issuing equity, the optimal level would be b B: a larger level is fully in-
corporated in the market price of shares, and bad entrepreneurs would take
this negative eﬀect into account. But after issuing equity the revenue from
the sale of shares is given, so the equilibrium level of private beneﬁts is ac-
tually B∗ > b B. Therefore, if bad entrepreneurs were able to commit to b B
prior to issuing equity, they would do so9; unfortunately, such a solution is
precluded by the incompleteness of contracts. The bottom line is that bad
entrepreneurs bear the full cost of the incentive distortion, created by the
8Assuming that the proportion (k)o fg-type is the same across the two groups simpliﬁes
the exposition, without altering any of the results obtained in the paper.
9This has become a standard outcome when time inconsistency is an issue, following
the seminal contribution of Kydland - Prescott (1977). The literature on time inconsis-
tency points to two kinds of solution to this problem: either a commitment device (like a
binding rule), or reputation (built up by "behaving" in a dynamic context). In this work
only the ﬁrst solution will be explored: a corporate governance institution - incorporated
in a statutory or legal rule - will be interpreted below as a commitment device. The
second solution seems less suitable to be applied in this context, where the current large
shareholder might be substituted by another one any time in the future.
8ability to extract private beneﬁts together with the sale of equity to external
investors. This point is formalized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 In the equilibrium with full information, bad entrepreneurs’ utility
level is Vmax +u[B∗(α)]−B∗(α),f o rα = αh,α l.I ft h e yw e r ea b l et oc o m m i t
t oas p e c i ﬁc level of B prior to issuing equity, bad entrepreneurs’ utility level
would be Vmax+u(b B)− b B.I ti sVmax+u[B∗(α)]−B∗(α) <V max+u(b B)− b B.
Proof. Thanks to assumption 7, the selling price of the equity share (1 −
α) must equal the payoﬀ that external investors expect from holding eq-
uity. The level of private beneﬁts is fully anticipated by investors. There-
fore, for any given level of B,ab-type earns a revenue from the equity
sale equal to Rb(α)=( 1− α)(Vmax − B), and his utility level is u(B)+
α(Vmax − B)+Rb(α)=Vmax + u(B) − B. From assumption 5, it follows
that b B =a r gm a x[ Vmax + u(B) − B]; hence b B is the optimal level of private
beneﬁts under commitment. From Lemma 1, the equilibrium level of private
beneﬁts is B∗(α) > b B,f o rα = αh,α l; so the equilibrium level of utility is
Vmax + u[B∗(α)] − B∗(α) <V max + u(b B) − b B.
Good entrepreneurs do not suﬀe rt h ea b o v ep r o b l e m ,s i n c et h e yd on o t
extract private beneﬁts. Their revenue from the equity sale is Rg(α)=
(1 − α)Vmax, and in equilibrium their utility level is αVmax + Rg(α)=Vmax.
2.4 Hidden information: the cross-subsidization out-
come
Let us now introduce Assumption 6 (hidden information). The consequence
is that bad entrepreneurs are subsidized by good ones.
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium with hidden information there is cross-
subsidization. Good (bad) entrepreneurs have a lower (higher) utility level
than in the equilibrium with full information.
Proof. With hidden information, the revenue from the equity sale is the
following for both types (t = g,b):
RHI(α)=( 1 − α)[kVmax +( 1− k)(Vmax − B
∗(α))] =
=( 1 − α)[Vmax − (1 − k)B
∗(α)] (3)
9since with probability k (1 − k) an investor buys shares issued by a g-type
(b-type). For α = αh,α l,i ti sRg(α) >R HI(α) >R b(α), and the equilibrium
levels of entrepreneurs’ utility are the following:
- g-type: αVmax + RHI(α)=Vmax − (1 − α)(1− k)B∗(α) <V max;
- b-type: u[B∗(α)] + α(Vmax − B∗(α)) + RHI(α)=
= Vmax+u[B∗(α)]−[1 − k(1 − α)]B∗(α) >V max+u[B∗(α)]−B∗(α).
As in any "lemon problem", issuers know the true (fundamental) value of
their shares, while external investors do not: hence both types issue equity
at the same price (within each group: those with α = αh and those with
α = αl)10, leading to an under(over)-evaluation of the shares issued by good
(bad) ﬁrms. As a consequence, good entrepreneurs bear part of the cost due
to the extraction of private beneﬁts by bad ones.
3 Governance regulation as a commitment de-
vice
There are several governance institutions enabling a controlling shareholder
to reduce his own direct inﬂuence over the management of the ﬁrm. In re-
cent years, an increasing role has been assigned to "independent" directors:
these are supposed to act in the interest of all shareholders and to exercise
a control function, avoiding that the private beneﬁts of some stakeholders
prevail over the maximization of the ﬁrm value. Sometimes the corporate
law mandates the presence of an audit committee, made up in prevalence
− or even entirely − of independent directors11. Other committees within
the board take up speciﬁc issues, like compensation and nomination: again,
independent directors should play a relevant role. In some countries (e.g.
Germany), the board of directors has a two-tier structure, with a Manage-
ment Board (MB) and a Supervisory Board (SB): controlling shareholders
are supposed to be represented only in the SB, with the power of appointing
and dismissing the members of the MB; the latter are entitled to run the ﬁrm
(while some strategic decisions and the balance sheet approval are retained
10Remember that α is public information, while t is private information of each issuer.
Note also that the hidden information problem aﬀects the market price of shares, while it
does not aﬀect the equilibrium level of private beneﬁts.
11See the Sarbanes - Oxley Act in the U.S. and the EU Commission Recommendation
of February 15, 2005.
10by the SB)12.
These governance institutions may be interpreted as a way through which
a controlling shareholder is committed to let the general interest of share-
holders − namely the maximization of the ﬁrm value − prevail over his own
private beneﬁts. Corporate rules (whether included in the law, in codes of
conduct or in charters) cannot directly specify a particular value of B,s i n c e
the level of private beneﬁts is not veriﬁable: the incompleteness of contracts
carries over to the corporate law13. The regulation can assign some relevant
decisions to an agent diﬀerent from the dominant shareholder, and introduce
checks and balances into the governance structure, which should in principle
avoid the extraction of private beneﬁts by the controlling shareholder.
However, the governance institutions which should implement this prin-
ciple are not perfect. As it is well known, there are several means through
which a large shareholder might aﬀe c ts o m em a n a g e r i a ld e c i s i o n s ,i ns u c ha
w a yt h a th i so w ni n t e r e s tp r e v a i l s :e . g . h i si n ﬂuence over the selection of
independent directors, the power of dismissing managers, or the ability to
collude with them.
In this section we consider a governance institution which is mandated
by the corporate law. This assumption will be relaxed in the next section,
where entrepreneurs are supposed to be free to apply a governance rule:
our main results will there be obtained. We introduce here the following
assumption (modifying assumption 2), where the parameter π measures the
degree of commitment incorporated into the governance institution; in other
words, π provides a measure of the eﬀectiveness, and of the credibility, of the
commitment imposed by the corporate regulation14.
Assumption 9 (regulation). After issuing equity, with probability π the
level of B is decided by a third party, with utility function V ; with probability
1 − π the level of B is decided by the large shareholder.
The regulation applies to all ﬁrms. However those ﬁrms, where the con-
trolling shareholder is of type g,a r eu n a ﬀected: here the level of private
beneﬁts is zero in any case. The regulation is instead binding on those ﬁrms
12For a comparative analysis of the legal framework of corporate governance in the US,
Europe and Japan, see Kraakman et al. (2004); see also Baums - Scott (2005), Hopt -
Leyens (2004), and Enriques - Volpin (2007).
13The concept of incomplete law − and its implications for the regulation of ﬁnancial
markets − is analyzed in Pistor - Xu (2003).
14Of course, perfect commitment is incorporated into the model as the particular case
where π =1 .
11where the controlling shareholder is of type b:h e r ep r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts are set
to a level B =0with probability π,a n dB = B∗(α) otherwise. The follow-
ing proposition shows how the regulation aﬀects the equilibrium with hidden
information.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium with regulation still implies cross-subsidization.
However, the regulation raises the utility level of a g-type, and it lowers the
utility of a b-type retaining a stake αh;t h ee ﬀect on a b-type retaining αl is
ambiguous.
Proof. For both types (t = g,b), the revenue from the equity sale is RC(α)
(C stands for commitment):
RC(α)=( 1 − α){kVmax +( 1− k)[πVmax +( 1− π)(Vmax − B
∗(α))]} =
=( 1 − α)[Vmax − (1 − k)(1− π)B
∗(α)] (4)
and Rg(α) >R C(α) >R b(α) (for α = αh,α l). The equilibrium levels of
utility are as follows:
- g-type: αVmax+RC(α)=Vmax −(1−α)(1− k)(1− π)B∗(α) >V max−
(1 − α)(1− k)B∗(α),f o rα = αh,α l;
- b-type: παVmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(α)] + α(Vmax − B∗(α))} + RC(α)=
= Vmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(α)] − [1 − k(1 − α)]B∗(α)}.
Vmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(αh)] − [1 − k(1 − αh)]B∗(αh)} <
<V max +{u[B∗(αh)] − [1 − k(1 − αh)]B∗(αh)}, since the term in brack-
e t si sp o s i t i v e ;
Vmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(αl)] − [1 − k(1 − αl)]B∗(αl)} Q
Q Vmax+{u[B∗(αl)] − [1 − k(1 − αl)]B∗(αl)}, since the sign of the term
in brackets is undetermined.
Note that RC(α) >R HI(α),a n dRC(α) is increasing in π.T h er e g u l a t i o n
cannot avoid cross-subsidization, as the market price of equity is the same for
bothtypes of ﬁrms (within each group: those with α = αh and those with α =
αl). However, the revenue from issuing equity is increased by the governance
institution, and the increase is larger the more binding is its commitment
power. The payoﬀ of a good entrepreneur is increased accordingly. The
eﬀect on the payoﬀ of a bad entrepreneur is not clear-cut, since the gain
from the higher market price of equity has to be balanced with the cost
of the constraint: the balance is negative for those retaining αh, and it is
ambiguous for those retaining αl.
124 Self-regulation as a separating tool
Several governance features are left to self-regulation, through best practice
codes, and to private initiative. Other features are imposed by the corporate
law. For example, the number of independent directors is largely left to the
discretion of shareholders, since the regulation generally mandates only a
minimum number. In some countries (France and Italy) the corporations are
free to chose between a one-tier and a two-tier board structure15, while in
many countries one of the two structures is imposed by the regulation (for
example: one-tier in the U.S. and U.K., two-tier in Germany). External and
internal auditing is regulated, but several details are left to private decisions
(like the choice of the auditor). So the authorities have often to decide the
border between regulatory imposition and self-regulation.
In this section we analyze the impact of a discretionary governance insti-
tution: corporations are supposed to be free to apply it, for example through
clauses inserted in their charters. In particular, we assume that a governance
institution is available, and large shareholders have to decide whether to ap-
ply it or not16. It is reasonable to assume that such decision is taken before
issuing equity, reﬂecting the fact that the adoption of governance rules is a
long run decision, that cannot easily be modiﬁed afterwards. By applying
the governance institution, a large shareholder voluntarily commits to let the
general interest of shareholders prevail over his own private beneﬁts (if any).
Formally, the following assumption − where the parameter π continues
to measure the degree of commitment incorporated into the governance in-
stitution − replaces assumption 9 (Figure 2 shows the timing of events).
Assumption 10 (self-regulation). Before issuing equity, the large share-
holder decides whether to apply (A)o rn o t(NA) the governance institution,
and this choice is public information. The consequences of his choice are as
follows.
-I fh ep l a y sA: after issuing equity, with probability π the level of
B is decided by a third party, with utility function V ; with probability 1 − π
15Actually, Italian companies may opt either for one of such two structures or for the
traditional model, where the company is run by the "consiglio d’amministrazione", with
the "collegio sindacale" playing an internal control function. Most Italian ﬁrms still rely
on this traditional governance structure.
16We are of course abstracting from the speciﬁc ways through which a large shareholder
can have a determinant inﬂuence over such decision (this kind of decisions are generally
taken in the shareholders’ meeting).
13the level of B is decided by the large shareholder himself.
-I fh ep l a y sNA: after issuing equity, he decides the optimal value
of B.
Assumption 10 implies that, in a ﬁrm where the controlling shareholder
is of type b and he plays A,p r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts are set to a level B =0with
probability π and B = B∗(α) otherwise; to the contrary, if he plays NA,
it is B = B∗(α).T h o s e ﬁrms, where the controlling shareholder is of type
g,a r en o ta ﬀected by the choice A,NA: the constraint possibly introduced
through the governance institution is not binding for them.
Lar ge 
sharehol ders 
pl ay  A  or NA




Fig.2 - Self-regulation: timing of events
Proposition 3 The equilibrium with self-regulation is as follows.
(A) If π ≥ π (where π is deﬁned in (5) below):
(A.1) within the group of entrepreneurs retaining an equity stake αh,a
separating equilibrium obtains, where good ones play A and bad ones play
NA; they have the same utility levels as with full information;
(A.2) within the group of entrepreneurs retaining an equity stake αl,a
pooling equilibrium obtains, where all play A and they have the same utility
levels as with regulation.
(B) If π<π, ∃k ∈ (0,1) such that if k ≥ k a pooling equilibrium obtains
in both groups (αh and αl), where all entrepreneurs play A and they have the
same utility levels as with regulation.
Proof. (A.1) Let α = αh.B y p l a y i n g A, good entrepreneurs signal their
type to investors. Hence a separating equilibrium obtains, where the revenue
from the equity sale is Rg(αh)=( 1− αh)Vmax for a g-type and Rb(αh)=
(1 − αh)[Vmax − B∗(αh)] for a b-type, and their utility levels are Vmax and
Vmax + u[B∗(αh)] − B∗(αh) respectively (as in the full information equilib-
rium of section 2.3). We have to check that the incentive compatibility
constraints (IC) for both types are met: a b-type does not have an in-
centive to "mimic" a g-type by playing A, and vice-versa. By playing A,
a b-type would get παhVmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(αh)] + αh (Vmax − B∗(αh))} +
14Rg(αh)=Vmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(αh)] − αhB∗(αh)}, hence IC for a b-type is:






By playing NA,ag-type would get αhVmax + Rb(αh)=Vmax − (1 −
αh)B∗(αh); hence IC for a g-type is: Vmax ≥ Vmax − (1 − αh)B∗(αh),w h i c h
is trivially met.
(A.2) Let α = αl. Condition (5) cannot hold, since u[B∗(αl)] <B ∗(αl);
so the separating equilibrium breaks down. Hence a pooling equilibrium
obtains, where the revenue from the equity sale is RC(αl) (see equation 4)
for both types, and utility levels are the following (see the proof of Proposition
2):
Vmax − (1 − αl)(1− k)(1− π)B∗(αl) for a g-type,
Vmax +( 1− π){u[B∗(αl)] − [1 − k(1 − αl)]B∗(αl)} for a b-type .
As for the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of investors, it is reasonable to assume
that they believe a deviating entrepreneur (playing NA)t ob eab-type: he
signals that he is unwilling to give up his private beneﬁts (with probability π).
Therefore, a g-type does not deviate, as he would get αlVmax+Rb(αl) instead
of αlVmax + RC(αl),w h e r eRb(αl) <R C(αl).Ab-type does not deviate if:
Vmax +( 1− π){u[B
∗(αl)] − [1 − k(1 − αl)]B
∗(αl)} (6)
≥ Vmax + u[B
∗(αl)] − B
∗(αl)
which holds for k =0 , and the LHS is increasing in k; hence condition (6)
holds for any k ≥ 0 (and any π).
(B) For the group of entrepreneurs retaining an equity stake αl, the proof
i st h es a m ea si n( A . 2 ) .
For the group of entrepreneurs retaining an equity stake αh,t h ep r o o fi s
t h es a m ea si n( A . 2 )w i t hαh replacing αl,e x c e p tf o rt h ef o l l o w i n g :
(i) the separating equilibrium breaks down because π<π;
(ii) for k =0condition (6) fails to hold, while for k =1it holds with
strict inequality17; hence ∃k ∈ (0,1) such that (6) is met iﬀ k ≥ k.
Corollary 1 Regulation is weakly Pareto-dominated by self-regulation.
17For k =1 , condition (6) boils down to π ≤ π, which is true by assumption.
15Proof. We only need to check that utility levels in (A.1) are higher than
those achieved with regulation. For a g-type:
Vmax >V max − (1 − αh)(1− k)(1− π)B∗(αh)
For a b-type:
Vmax+u[B∗(αh)]−B∗(αh) ≥ Vmax+(1 − π){u[B∗(αh)] − [1 − k(1 − αh)]B∗(αh)}
this inequality is met for k =1(given π ≥ π), and the RHS is increasing
in k, so it is met (with strict inequality) for any k<1 as well.
Proposition 3 shows our main point: self-regulation may be used as a
separating tool, within the group of entrepreneurs retaining a high equity
stake (αh); then good entrepreneurs avoid subsidizing bad ones. The reason
behind such result relies in the diﬀerent cost of the governance institution,
introduced in order to prevent large shareholders from pursuing their own pri-
vate beneﬁts: this is costly for a bad type (constrained to give up u[B∗(αh)]
with probability π) and it is costless for a good type.
Separation does not emerge within the group of entrepreneurs retaining
a low equity stake (αl). The diﬀerent outcome across the two groups (αh
and αl) deserves an explanation. As we noted above (paragraph 2.3), a bad
entrepreneur would commit to set B = b B,i fh ew e r ea b l et od os o : b B is the
ﬁrst best level of private beneﬁts (the one chosen by an owner retaining the
whole equity, i.e. α =1 ). The governance institution provides a commitment
device, but this is imperfect: in particular, it implies a constraint to set
B =0(with probability π). Therefore only those entrepreneurs, starting
from a high level of private beneﬁts (B∗(αl)), are willing to implement such
a commitment device: the distortion due to private beneﬁts (B∗(αl) − b B)i s
large, and the commitment enables them to avoid such distortion. To the
contrary, those facing a lower distortion (B∗(αh)− b B) are not willing to give
up their private beneﬁts altogether18.
The bottom line is that the governance institution is applied by those
ﬁrms where controlling shareholders either do not have private beneﬁts (g-
type) or they start from a high level of private beneﬁts, as they retain a
small fraction of equity (b-type, αl); it is not applied by those ﬁrms where
the controlling shareholder extract a low level of private beneﬁts, retaining
a large share of equity (b-type, αh).
It is worth noting that the separation outcome can be reached only if the
18Note that a bad entrepreneur with a high share of equity (αh) is not willing to commit,
even though by committing he would be able to "mimic" a good type and sell shares at
price Rg(αh) instead of Rb(αh).
16commitment power of the governance institution is strong enough (π ≥ π):
otherwise, the cost of the constraint to set B =0is too low for bad types,
compared with the beneﬁt of issuing equity at a higher price by "imitating"
good types. In the latter case, a pooling equilibrium obtains (provided k is
large enough), where all ﬁrms apply the governance institution. The con-
dition π ≥ π is weaker the larger αh: a higher concentration of ownership
makes the separating equilibrium more likely19.
Corollary 1 highlights that the outcome of self-regulation is superior (at
least equivalent) to the one obtained by regulation. Intuitively, as far as
the governance institution is useful as a commitment device, it is applied
by ﬁrms without any need to be imposed: under this regard, regulation and
self-regulation are equivalent. But only self-regulation makes the governance
institution be useful as a separating device, leading to a better outcome than
regulation.
5 Summary and conclusions
The model presented here follows the approach introduced by Jensen - Meck-
ling (1976), where the ability to extract private beneﬁts raises the cost of eq-
uity funding, so it hurts issuers themselves; the incentive distortion, leading
to an excess level of beneﬁts, is higher the lower the equity stake retained
by the controlling shareholder. Their framework is extended by adding the
assumption that two types of ﬁrms sell equity to outside investors: those
where controlling shareholders are able to extract private beneﬁts (bad type),
and those where they are not able - or willing - to do so (good type). Since
investors cannot distinguish between the two types of issuers, a "lemon prob-
lem" emerges, where bad ﬁrms are subsidized by good ones. A governance
institution is introduced in this context: by adopting it, a controlling share-
holder commits to act in the general interest of shareholders, neglecting his
own private beneﬁts (if any). The commitment device is in general imperfect:
it leaves the controlling shareholder some room for pursuing his own private
beneﬁts. The following results are obtained.
First, the governance institution is useful as a commitment device for
those (bad) controlling shareholders retaining a small share of equity: they
start from a high level of private beneﬁts, so they are ready to bind themselves
19By derivating (5), the reader can check that π is decreasing in αh (in the limit, when
α = α it is π =1 ,w h e nα =1it is π =0 ).
17as a remedy to their incentive distortion. To the contrary, those with a large
share of equity do not want to put a constraint on themselves, since they start
from a lower level of private beneﬁts, not too far from the ﬁrst best level (i.e.
the level prevailing absent separation between ownership and control).
Second, the governance institution may be useful as a separating device
for those (good) controlling shareholders unable to extract private beneﬁts.
By applying it, they signal their type and issue equity at a higher price, thus
avoiding to subsidize the other type of ﬁrms. This separation outcome may
be achieved only if the commitment power of the governance institution is
not too low.
Third, self-regulation is superior to regulation: issuers’ payoﬀsa r ew e a k l y
larger with the former than with the latter. As far as the governance insti-
tution is useful as a commitment device, it is applied by ﬁrms without any
imposition by the law: then self-regulation and regulation reach the same
outcome. However, separation may be achieved only by self-regulation, lead-
ing to an improvement over regulation.
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